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Justin B. Miller appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict
finding him guilty of aggravated assault and misdemeanor battery. Miller claims
error in relation to some of the district court's evidentiary rulings.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
On New Year's Eve 2012 and into the early morning hours of New Year's
Day, several people went to Justin and Melissa Miller's house. (Trial Tr., Vol. 1,1
p.163, Ls.20-23.)

At one point, Melissa noticed her husband, Miller, was not

among the guests and she went into their bedroom to check on him. (Trial Tr.,
Vol. I, p.271, Ls.5-9.)

According to the testimony of Angela Smith, who was

standing in the kitchen with Carrie Macias, Carrie heard what she thought were
screams. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.167, Ls.8-20.) At first, Angela "thought it was part of
the music" but went to "check and see what it was." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.167, L.22
- p.168, L.1.)

When Angela got to the living room, she could hear a "raspy

scream" coming from the master bedroom.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.168, Ls.2-12.)

When she opened the bedroom door, she saw Miller with "his hands around
[Melissa's] neck," choking her, and Melissa was "struggling and screaming."
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.168, L.21 - p.169, L.21.)

Angela intervened by grabbing

Miller's shoulders and telling him to "let go." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.171, Ls.19-21.)

There are two transcripts for the trial in this case - one that contains all of the
trial testimony except the testimony that occurred during the afternoon on August
14, 2012, and one that contains the August 14, 2012 afternoon testimony. The
former will be referred to as "Trial Tr., Vol. I" and the latter as "Trial Tr., Vol. II."
1
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"turned around" and "pushed" Angela, knocking her backwards and
causing her to hit her head on the door. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.172,

1-6.) Miller

then went towards Angela and told her to "get the fuck out of his house." (Trial
Tr., Vol. I, p.172, Ls.6-7.) The male guests at the house - Andy Seher and Pat
Macias - came into the bedroom then and Angela "flipped over and crawled out
in between them." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.173, Ls.8-11.)
From the bedroom, Angela went into the kitchen as did Carrie and
Melissa.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.173, Ls.17-20.) Angela testified that Melissa was

"very shaky, crying, and her face was very red" and that she said Miller hit her.2
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.174, Ls.11-15, p.175, Ls.15-18.) A few minutes later, Miller
came out of the bedroom and Angela saw him grab a "rifle-like" gun. (Trial Tr.,
Vol. I, p.176, L.22 - p.177, L.2, p.178, L.13.) Angela testified Miller was "waving
or pointing it to everyone that was in the room, making the general statement,
again, get the fuck out of my house." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.178, Ls.15-18.)
Nadine Steen, who was sitting on the couch in the living room with Andy,
also testified that she heard struggling in the bedroom and told Andy to go check
to see what was happening.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.206, Ls.1-1S.)

When Andy

opened the door, Nadine said she heard Melissa saying "[h]e hit me, he hit me"
and "[h]e knows I am claustrophobic" and that Angela "was on the floor
struggling, trying to get out." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.207, Ls.3-7.) Nadine also saw

2 Melissa later denied as much, claiming the contact was accidental. (Trial Tr.,
Vol. l,p.275, Ls.3-21.) Melissa, however, acknowledged that Miller pushed
Angela, but said it was self-defense. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.278, Ls.1-11, p.315,
Ls.12-16.)

2

there was a "baby in the

who Andy was

to comfort.

,Vol. I,

p.208, Ls.19-21.)
Consistent

Angela's testimony, Nadine testified

telling people to "get the fuck out" of his house.

3

was angry and

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.211, LS.22-

24.) Nadine went out the "slider door," but the backyard had a "fence taller than
what [she] would be able to climb" and she did not have her coat or shoes. (Trial
Tr., Vol. I, p.212, Ls.1-23.) Nadine came back in the house a few minutes later
to get her "belongings and get out the front door." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.213, L.20
p.214, L.2.) After Nadine went back in, she saw Miller come "around the corner
with a gun." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.214, Ls.7-10.) Nadine testified Miller pointed the
gun at her chest, cocked it and told her he was going to "shoot [her] fucking ass."
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.214, Ls.22-25.) When Miller did that, "[s]omeone [ J hollered,
got his attention," and Miller "started swinging the gun around." (Trial Tr., Vol. I,
p.216, Ls.2-3.) After Miller turned away from Nadine, she grabbed her coat and
shoes and ran out the door. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.216, Ls.3-6.) Nadine called 911
and reported the incident. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.216, Ls.19-21.)
The state charged Miller with (1) felony domestic battery in the presence
of a child for the alleged offense against Melissa, (2) aggravated assault against
Nadine, and (3) misdemeanor battery against Angela Smith. (R., pp.190-191.)
Miller pled not guilty and the case proceeded to trial. (See R., pp.82-84.) The

3 Melissa also acknowledged Miller was yelling at people to "get the fuck out" and
that he got his gun, but claimed he did not point it at anyone because he "didn't
have time" because Pat "grapped it from him." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.281, L.9 p.283, L.22.)

3

acquitted Miller of
of aggravated assault

battery in

presence of a child but found

misdemeanor battery. (R., pp.291

The court imposed a 180-day

178 days

, on

the battery charge and a unified five-year sentence with two years fixed for the
aggravated assault charge; the court also retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.30B-311.)
Miller filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.316-31B.)

4

Miller states the issues on

as:

1)

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed
Nadine Steen to offer hearsay testimony about what she told
the 911 operator?

2)

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed
Officer Austin Cady to testify about irrelevant information?

3)

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the
testimony of Melissa Miller about whether the family had a
tradition of shooting guns on New Year's Day because the
testimony was not relevant?

4)

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed
Angie Smith to offer hearsay testimony about what she told
Melissa Miller in the kitchen on the day of the alleged
incident?

5)

Under the doctrine of cumulative error, was Mr. Miller's right
to a fair trial denied as a result of the accumulation of
serious errors throughout his trial?

(Appellant's Brief, p.2.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Miller failed to show error in the district court's evidentiary rulings?

2.

Because Miller has failed to show any error, is the cumulative error
doctrine inapplicable?

5

I.

A.

Introduction
Miller asserts the district court erred in relation to four different evidentiary

rulings. (Appellant's Brief, pp.3-12.) More specifically, Miller contends the court
erroneously admitted

hearsay testimony and irrelevant testimony.

(ld.)

Application of the correct legal standards shows Miller has failed to show error,
much less reversible error, in relation to any of his claims.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its

judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010) (citations omitted).
When reviewing discretionary decisions, this Court considers whether the trial
court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, whether it acted within
the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with any applicable legal
standards, and whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason. State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 824, 215 P.3d 538, 544 (Ct. App.
2009) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600,768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).

C.

Miller's Hearsay Arguments Do Not Entitle Him To Reversal Of His
Convictions
Miller claims the district court erroneously admitted hearsay testimony

from Nadine Steen about what she told the 911 dispatcher and from Angela

6

Smith about what Angela said to Melissa after
bedroom.

(Appellant's Brief,

, 11

2.)

altercation with Miller in the
Neither of Miller's

arguments entitle him to reversal of his convictions.
Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted."

I.R.E. 801 (c). Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible

except as provided in the Rules of Evidence. State v. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22,
25, 205 P.3d 671, 674 (Ct. App. 2009); I.R.E. 802.

"Not all out-of-court

statements are hearsay, however." State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 704, 889
P.2d 729, 733 (Ct. App. 1994) For example, "[i]f a statement is not an assertion
of fact or is not offered to prove the fact asserted, it is not hearsay." kL,; also
State v. Seigel, 137 Idaho 538, 540-41, 50 P.3d 1033, 1035-36 (Ct. App. 2002)
("It is well established that out-of-court statements are not barred by the hearsay
rule when offered to show their effect on the listener. "). Nadine's and Angela's
challenged testimony was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of
the matter asserted.

1.

Nadine's Testimony About Her Report To 911

At trial, the prosecutor asked Nadine if she told the 911 operator what
happened to her.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.228, Ls.24-25.)

Miller objected "as to

relevance and hearsay." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.229, Ls.1-2.) The court overruled the
objection, stating: "It is not hearsay. It is marginally relevant." (Trial Tr., Vol. I,
p.229, Ls.3-4.) Nadine answered: "Yes, I did." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.229, L.5.) The
prosecutor then asked Nadine whether she "indicate[d] to the 911 operator that

7

pointed a

r.

again objected based on

, Vol. I, p.229, Ls.6-7.) Miller

[her]."
(Trial

responded: "Overruled. The witness is

!

Vol. I, p.229, Ls.9-10.) The court
and subject to cross-

examination." (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.229, Ls.11-12.) Nadine answered, "Yes, I did."
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.229, L.14.)
On appeal, Miller argues Nadine's "statement that she told the 911
operator that Mr. Miller pointed a gun at her is an out of court statement" that has
"no purpose ... other than for the truth of the matter asserted." (Appellant's
Brief, p.5.)

Thus, Miller concludes, "By definition the testimony offered was

hearsay and the district court erred in overruling [his] hearsay objection."
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Miller is incorrect. It is apparent from the context that
Nadine's testimony was offered to establish the course of events after the
assault, including contacting 911, which resulted in the dispatch of officers to the
scene.

This view of the testimony is consistent with the prosecutor's next

question, which was: "At some point did the police arrive?" (Trial Tr., Vol. I,
p.229, L.15.) It is also consistent with the fact that Nadine testified to the "truth
of the matter asserted," i.e., that Miller pointed a gun at her, before the
prosecutor asked whether she communicated that information to the 911
operator. Nadine's subsequent testimony that she reported as much to 911 was

8

correctly overruled

not hearsay and the district
if
operator that

court

objection.

4

to testify that she

in

911

error was harmless.

pointed a

evidence is erroneously admitted, the test for determining if the error was
harmless is "'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence
complained of might have contributed to the conviction and that the court must
be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477,488,873 P.2d 122, 133 (1994) (quoting State v.
Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 762, 810 P.2d 680, 700 (1991 )); see also State v.
Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 976, 829 P.2d 861, 865 (1992) (quoting State v.
Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507, 616 P.2d 1034, 1043 (1980)) (to hold erroneous
admission of evidence harmless, court must "'declare a belief, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that [the] evidence
complained of contributed to the conviction''') (brackets original). The State has
the burden of demonstrating that an objected-to error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974

(2010).
As noted, Nadine directly testified to Miller's act of pointing a loaded
shotgun at her. There is no reasonable possibility that Nadine's testimony that

The court's response appears to address a Confrontation Clause concern and
does not specifically address whether the statement is hearsay. Although the
court may have concluded the statement was offered for a non-hearsay purpose,
even if it did not, this Court can affirm on this basis. State v. Howell, 137 Idaho
817, 820, 54 P.3d 460, 463 (Ct. App. 2002) (affirming admission of hearsay on
alternative basis).
4

9

she also reported the same
of

911 contributed to the jury's verdict finding
claims

dispute was whether

pointed a firearm at

Nad

testimony that she told the 911 operator as much was for the non-hearsay
purpose of "bolster[ing] [her] credibility."

(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)

While the

prosecutor noted in closing argument that Nadine's 911 call was "another piece
of corroboration" (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.383, Ls.20-23), it was Nadine's act of calling
911 that corroborated her version of events, not that she told the 911 operator
the same thing that she testified to at trial. Indeed, it is hardly surprising that her
statement to 911 was the same as her trial testimony.
Further, Nadine's testimony that she told the 911 operator that Miller
pointed a shotgun at her was not the only evidence to support her version of
events.

As explained by the prosecutor in closing argument (including his

reference to the 911 call):
[Nadine] is very clear about what he did. She is very
concise that the shotgun was leveled at her. She told you that he
pumped the action. You know from the evidence, from the actual
physical evidence, and what I am talking about is the gun here, that
the gun was loaded, that it had one in the tube and two more in the
chamber. There is physical evidence, in other words, that backs up
her claim that a gun was loaded, actual physical evidence.
More corroboration comes in the form of her actions.
Nadine took some pretty dramatic measures after the gun was
pointed at her. And what I mean by that is don't forget what time of
the year it is. It is January 1st. It is almost 6 A.M. It is going to be
cold here in North Idaho. She runs out of the house after he points
the gun at her with no shoes on and no coat on and her cell phone
and runs down the street. Her action after he pointed the gun at
her corroborates her testimony that he did point that gun at her.

10

You know from the testimony here that she immediately
called 911, and she was very upset, that she told the 911 operator
that he pointed that gun at her.
Again another piece
corroboration in this case.
So you not only have physical evidence, the gun itself, but
you have witness testimony that supports each other ....
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.383, L2 - p.384, L 1.)
That other testimony includes Angela Smith's testimony that she saw
Miller grab his gun, "wav[e] or point[ ] it to everyone that was in the room, making
the general statement, again, get the fuck out of my house." (Trial Tr., Vol. I,
p.178, Ls. 13-18.) Even Miller's wife acknowledged that Miller twice told the girls
to "get the fuck out," and, when the girls did not respond, he retrieved his gun
and repeated his directive that they "get the fuck out of [his] house" and, at that
point, Nadine ran out (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.281, L6 - p.283, L 13, p.318, L.16 p.323, L.6.)
Even assuming Nadine's testimony that she reported to 911 that Miller
pointed a gun at her was inadmissible hearsay, based on the evidence
presented, there is no reasonable possibility that the testimony contributed to the
jury's verdict finding Miller guilty of aggravated assault

2.

Angela's Testimony About What She Told Melissa

During Angela's testimony, the following exchange occurred:
Q: BY [PROSECUTOR]: What did Melissa Miller say there in the
kitchen?
A: She stated he hit me. And my response to her was hit you. He
was choking you.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I object to that as hearsay.

11

THE COU

It is

witness's

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That witness's statement is hearsay,
THE COURT: This is what the witness said to Melissa Miller, he
was choking you. That's not hearsay. She is here and she is
testifying.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, she has testified as to what she said
back then, Judge. It makes it an out-of-court statement. If it is
offered for the truth, in my opinion, it makes it hearsay.
THE COURT: It is not hearsay. Overruled.
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.175, L.15 - p.176, L.5.)
Miller challenges the admission of Angela's testimony that she told
Melissa, "He was choking you," asserting the statement was hearsay and the
district court's ruling reflects an "incorrect understanding of the hearsay rules."
(Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Miller's claim fails.
Before Angela testified about what happened in the kitchen, she testified
that she walked into the bedroom and saw Miller with his hands around Melissa's
neck, choking her, and Melissa was screaming and struggling. (Trial Tr., Vol. I,
p.169, Ls.9-25.) As with Nadine's testimony about her report to 911, Angela's
testimony about what happened after she entered the bedroom was not offered
for the truth of the matter, i.e., that Miller choked Melissa, but to explain what
happened afterwards, including Melissa's acknowledgment that Miller hit her.
The district court's conclusion that it was not hearsay was correct. 5

5 As with the court's ruling on Miller's hearsay objection to Nadine's testimony,
this Court can affirm on the basis that the testimony was not hearsay even if this
was not the basis of the district court's ruling.

12

Even if the court erred in allowing Angela to repeat

told Melissa

about what she saw, the error was harmless not only

Angela also

directly testified that she observed Miller choking Melissa, which was consistent
with her statement to Melissa, but also because the jury acquitted Miller of the
felony domestic battery charge against Melissa.

(R., p.291.)

Miller, however,

contends, the error was not harmless because he believes it contributed to the
aggravated assault verdict. (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Specifically, Miller argues:
"This case was ultimately a credibility determination for the jury to decide if
Nadine Steen was telling the truth.

Utilizing improper hearsay to discredit

Melissa Miller reduced her credibility with the jury."
Miller's argument is illogical.

(Appellant's Brief, p.12.)

First, his claim of prejudice arises out of a non-

hearsay use of the evidence (credibility). Second, Angela's statement to Melissa
about what she saw happen did not, on its face, "discredit" Melissa's testimony
and any contrary interpretation of the challenged portion of Angela's testimony is
inconsistent with the fact that the jury acquitted Miller of battering his wife.
Moreover, what Angela told Melissa she saw Miller do to her had absolutely no
bearing on what Miller did to Nadine.

There is no reasonable possibility that

Angela's testimony that she told Melissa, "hit you.

He was choking you,"

contributed to the jury verdict finding Miller guilty of aggravated assault against
Nadine.

13

D.

Convictions
allowing testimony from Deputy

complains the district

Austin Cady about where he parked his car and testimony from Melissa about
their family tradition of shooting guns on New Year's Day.

(Appellant's Brief,

pp.7-10.) Miller contends the testimony on both of these points was irrelevant.
(Id.) Miller is incorrect.

1.

Deputy Cady's Testimony About Where He Parked His Car

On direct examination, Deputy Cady testified about the circumstances
surrounding his initial arrival at the Miller residence. Deputy Cady explained:
Myself and Deputy Dyre were the first ones and Deputy
Mumford were the first ones to arrive on scene. Deputy Mumford
came in from another access street on the west side of the
residence. Deputy Dyre and I came in on the east side of the
residence. We parked probably a residence away due to officer
safety, I mean threat of a gun being used to force people out of the
house.
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.98, L.21 - p.gg, L.2.)
Miller first objected based on hearsay and the court overruled the
objection. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.gg, Ls.3-5.) Miller then asserted: "Not relevant."
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.gg, L.6.) The transcript does not reflect any response from the
court in relation to Miller's relevance objection. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.gg, L.6.)
Rather, Deputy Cady continued in his testimony about what occurred when he
and the other officers arrived on scene. (See Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.gg, Ls.6-16.)

14

On appeal,

asserts the court "apparently overruled the

objection as the testimony was
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)

be presented to the

,,6

While it is true that Deputy Cady's testimony was

presented to the jury, no ruling is "apparent[

r from the record.

As such, there is

no basis for finding that the court "overruled" the relevance objection.

It is

equally possible that the court did not hear the objection. In any event, absent
an adverse ruling by the district court, there is nothing for this Court to review
with respect to Miller's complaint regarding the relevance of Deputy Cady's
testimony about where he parked. State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 420,
272 P.3d 382, 392 (2012) (declining to review an issue where there was no
adverse ruling by the district court); State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 295, 62 P.3d
214, 219 (Ct. App. 2003) (same).
Even if this Court presumes the relevance objection was heard and
overruled, Miller has failed to show such an implied or silent ruling was
erroneous. "Whether evidence is relevant under Rule 401 is an issue of law that
[this Court} review[s] de novo, while the decision to admit relevant evidence over
a Rule 403 objection is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Tankovich,
155 Idaho 221, _ , 307 P.3d 1247, 1251 (Ct. App. 2013) (citations omitted).
Evidence that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the case,
and has any tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable than it
would be without the evidence is relevant. State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 547,
768 P.2d 807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989).

6

It seems axiomatic that the state may

Although Miller notes the hearsay objection, he does not challenge the district

15

present

to

to

a reported
crime

As noted in ====-"":"':"""':"":"'::='-'-' 121

18, 1

822 P.2d

538 (Ct. App. 1991), "Generally, some leeway is allowed even on direct
examination for preliminary facts that do not bear directly on the legal issues, but
merely provide background for the narrative, to give it interest and context."
Even assuming the district court overruled Miller's relevance objection to Deputy
Cody's testimony, such a ruling was not erroneous.
Miller next complains that, even if relevant, Deputy Cady's testimony was
unfairly prejudicial under I.R.E. 403. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) Miller did not,
however, object to the testimony based on I.R.E. 403.

He cannot, therefore,

complain of its admission on this basis. State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 221,
207 P.3d 186, 197 (Ct. App. 2009) ("This Court will not address an issue not
preserved for appeal by an objection in the trial court" absent a showing of
fundamental error.); State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct.
App. 2000) ("For an objection to be preserved for appellate review, the specific
ground for the objection must be clearly stated. Objecting to the admission of
evidence on one basis does not preserve a separate and different basis for
exclusion of the evidence."); I.R. E. 1 03(a)(1).
Even if Miller could pursue his I.R.E. 403 argument on appeal, it would
fail. "Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 states that, although relevant, 'evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

court's decision to overrule it. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp1 .. 9.)
16

'" Carlson, 134 Idaho at 397, 3 P.3d at 75 (quoting I.

403).

does not offer protection against evidence that is merely prejudicial in
sense of being detrimental to the party's case."

~

(citation omitted).

Rather, Ruie 403 "protects against evidence that is unfairly prejudicial-that is if
it tends to suggest decision on an improper basis."

~

at 397-398, 3 P.3d at 75-

76. "This is so because almost all evidence in a criminal trial is demonstrably
admitted to prove the case of the state and, thus, results in prejudice to a
defendant."

~

at 398, 3 P.3d at 76.

There was no danger of unfair prejudice in Deputy Cady testifying that law
enforcement parked away from the residence "due to officer safety" because of
the "threat of a gun being used to force people out of the house." (Trial Tr., Vol.
I, p.98, L.25 - p.99, L.2.) It was undisputed that Miller had a gun and that he
was saying, "get the fuck out of my house."

Exactly how it was unfairly

prejudicial for Deputy Cady to acknowledge the nature of the call and explain
how he and other officers acted accordingly is unclear. The only argument Miller
offers in this regard is the same argument he has offered in contending the
admission of hearsay testimony was erroneous, i.e., it bolstered Nadine's
credibility. Deputy Cady's testimony about where he parked and why does no
such thing. That the officers took precautions based on the nature of the call to
which they were dispatched does not make Nadine's report of what happened
any more or less credible nor was it unfairly prejudicial for Deputy Cady to
testified that he and other officers took precautions in responding to a situation
that involved a gun.
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Miller's

Deputy

Court finds

of the testimony

assuming this Court
testimony and even assuming

erroneous, any error was harmless for the same reasons the

asserts in

response to Miller's LR.E. 403 argument.

2.
The

Melissa's Testimony About The Tradition Of Shooting Guns
following

exchange

occurred

during

the

prosecutor's

cross-

examination of Melissa:
Q: Now, when you were speaking with the deputy, he asked you
about the shotgun, did he not?
A: Yes, he did.

Q: And you told him it was a family tradition to go out on New
Year's and shoot their guns?
A: I don't recall saying that.
Q: Did you say that or not?

A: No, did not.
Q: It is a family tradition to go out and shoot guns on New Year's?
A: No, it is not.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.337, Ls.9-19.)
After Melissa answered that it was not a family tradition, Miller objected
based on relevance and the court overruled the objection.
p.337, Ls.20-21.)

(Trial Tr., Vol. I,

Miller contends the court erred in overruling his objection,

arguing whether he "has a family tradition to go out and shoot guns on New
Year's Day does not make any fact of whether [he] committed aggravated
assault more or less probable." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Miller further asserts,
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"Because there is no relevance to the testimony, the probative impact does not
outvI/eigh

prejudicial impact it

"(Appellant's Brief (citing I.R.

403).)

Miller's relevance argument lacks merit and to the extent he is making an I.

E.

403 argument, it is not preserved.
In arguing that Melissa's testimony about the family tradition of shooting
guns on New Year's was irrelevant, Miller ignores the context in which the
question was asked. The prosecutor was examining Melissa about what she told
the officer about the gun - a line of questioning to which Miller did not object.
When Melissa denied telling the officer of such a tradition, the prosecutor
properly inquired whether it was, in fact, a tradition in an effort to impeach
Melissa. Such a question was not irrelevant or improper. See State v. Joy, 155
Idaho 1, _ , 304 P.3d 276, 289-290 (2013) (a witness's credibility may be
attacked with prior inconsistent statements). Miller's assertion to the contrary is
without merit.
With respect to Miller's !.R.E. 403 argument, he did not object to the
question on this basis. The court should, therefore, decline to consider whether
the testimony, even if irrelevant, should have been excluded as unfairly
prejudicial.

Even if considered, Melissa's testimony that they did not have a

family tradition of shooting guns on New Year's was not prejudicial at all, much
less unfairly prejudicial.
Finally, even if this Court concludes the court erred in allowing the
admission of Melissa's testimony that they did not have a family tradition of
shooting guns on New Year's, there is no reasonable possibility that evidence
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II.
Because There Was No Error, The Doctrine Of Cumulative Error Does Not Apply

"The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when
there is 'an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be
harmless, but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in
contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to due process."

State v.

Draper, 151 Idaho 576,594,261 P.3d 853,871 (2011) (citations, quotations and
alteration omitted). A necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error
doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396,
958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998).
Because Miller has failed to show any error, much less two or more errors,
the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case. Even if this Court
concludes two or more errors, the errors Miller complains of are so minor, even if
aggregated, he still received a fair trial.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdict finding Miller guilty of aggravated assault and battery.
DATED this 21 st day of February 2014.

Deputy Attorney General
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